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Getting science policy right is a core objective of government that bears on scientific advance, 
economic growth, health, and longevity. Yet the process of science is changing. As science 
advances and knowledge accumulates, ensuing generations of innovators spend longer in training 
and become more narrowly expert, shifting key innovations (i) later in the life cycle and (ii) from 
solo researchers toward teams.  This paper summarizes the evidence that science has evolved - 
and continues to evolve - on both dimensions.  The paper then considers science policy. The 
ongoing shift away from younger scholars and toward teamwork raises serious policy challenges. 
Central issues involve (a) maintaining incentives for entry into scientific careers as the training 
phase extends, (b) ensuring effective evaluation of ideas (including decisions on patent rights 
and research grants) as evaluator expertise narrows, and (c) providing appropriate effort 
incentives as scientists increasingly work in teams.  Institutions such as government grant 
agencies, the patent office, the science education system, and the Nobel Prize come under a 
unified focus in this paper.  In all cases, the question is how these institutions can change. As 
science evolves, science policy may become increasingly misaligned with science itself – unless 
science policy evolves in tandem. 
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I.  Introduction 
The role of the individual in science is rapidly changing.  Recent literature demonstrates 
(i) ubiquitous shifts towards teamwork in science, and (ii) decreasing innovative output by 
younger scholars.  This paper will review these facts, consider their explanation, and then 
consider their implications for science policy.  At root, this paper asks a simple question:  in light 
of these substantial shifts in the scientific process, how might science policy evolve? 
To motivate the basic dynamics in science and frame them in pursuit of rethinking policy, 
consider the following two observations.  First, innovators are not born at the frontier of 
knowledge; rather, innovators first undertake significant education.  Second, if knowledge 
accumulates and fields deepen over time, then ensuing generations of innovators can face an 
increasing educational burden.  Put another way, if one wants to stand on the shoulders of giants 
(taking Newton’s famous aphorism) then one must first climb up the giants’ backs.  As 
knowledge accumulates, the harder this climb can become.   
Empirically, one starting point to motivate this ‘burden of knowledge’ perspective and 
the associated dynamics in science is to consider knowledge stocks and flows.  Figure 1 shows 
the annual number of journal articles published worldwide.
1  In 2006, there were 941,000 articles 
published, 90% of which appeared in science and engineering journals. Collectively, these 
articles cited 4,372,000 unique journal articles published in prior years.  It is clear that one 
individual can know only a fraction of this knowledge.  Moreover, assuming that individuals 
devote a particular amount of time to absorbing knowledge, then it is clear that the fraction of 
such knowledge known by any one individual will be decreasing with time.  As indicated in 
Figure 1, the growth rate in publications averages 5.5% per year, which doubles collective 
publication rates every 13 years.  If any particular individual meaningfully engages only a fixed 
                                                            
1 These article counts come from the Institute of Science Information’s Web of Science database. 2 
 
number of such articles, then the fraction of extant knowledge known by an individual would 
decline at the same rate: -5.5% per year.
2 
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Notes:  This figure presents the number of publications in each year, worldwide, as recorded by the Institute of 
Scientific Information’s Web of Science database, pooling articles across all fields of science and engineering and 
social sciences. Growth rates in publications are similar looking only at authors with U.S. addresses.  Over 90% of 
the articles are, consistently, in science and engineering fields. See text for further discussion. 
Below we will examine richer and more systematic evidence about the implications of 
such expansions of knowledge.  But it should be clear at this point that innovators face a shifting 
landscape in which they become educated and produce new ideas.  In fact, one may expect two 
natural responses in innovators’ educational decisions as the volume of knowledge expands: 
1.  First, innovators may spend longer in education; 
2.  Second, innovators may seek narrower expertise.   
                                                            
2 That is, let N be the total number of papers (or other codified ideas) in the world and let this number grow at rate 
gN.  Let Q be the fixed number of papers that an individual has time to learn.  Then the share of extant knowledge 
known by the individual is s = Q/N, and the growth rate of s is then gs = - gN.  3 
 
The first dimension suggests that innovators would spend a greater portion of their early 
life-cycle in education – as opposed to actively innovating – so that innovation becomes less 
likely at young ages.  The second dimension, the narrowing of expertise, is essentially a ‘death of 
the Renaissance man’ effect.  It will tend to reduce the technology-wide capacities of individual 
innovators, who become less able to draw on knowledge in other fields in their creative process 
and less capable of implementing ideas by themselves.  The narrowing of expertise thus suggests 
fundamental changes in the organization of innovative activity, with innovators increasingly 
working in teams.  This reasoning suggests potentially powerful shifts in the process of science.  
In fact, scientists themselves, as will be detailed extensively below, have rapidly and generally 
evolved in how they produce new ideas, with the probability of signature contributions declining 
at younger ages and increasing among teams. 
Now consider science policy. Science policy bears on scientific progress and the effects 
of such progress, including advances in economic prosperity, health and longevity.  Moreover, as 
further discussed below, central features of ideas themselves suggest substantial market failures 
in idea production, so that government policy has explicit roles to play in fostering idea 
production. 
The objective of this paper is to examine how science policy itself might evolve.  Given 
that science is changing, the institutions that are efficient in supporting science at one point in 
time may be less appropriate at a later point of time. On precise dimensions, a failure to 
continually re-tune science policy may therefore impede scientific progress.   
First, science policy critically influences entry into scientific careers.  Research agencies 
like the NIH actively wrestle with why young scientists have become increasingly unlikely to 
win research grants, which are critical to career progress and success. In fact, former NIH 
director Elias Zerhouni identified this age trend as the most important challenge for American 
science and funding agencies (Kaiser 2008).  From the burden of knowledge perspective, this age 
trend follows in part because younger scholars have ever-extending training phases, so that 
substantial innovative contributions become increasingly unlikely at younger ages. The resulting 
bias toward older scholars may thus have a strong foundation. On the other hand, lengthening 
training phases reduce incentives to enter scientific careers. If talented individuals increasingly 4 
 
avoid science in favor of other careers, then scientific progress and economic growth will slow, 
especially to the extent that other careers do not provide the same positive spillovers for 
economic prosperity that come via innovation. This selection issue suggests that various kinds of 
support targeted to the young – though perhaps not major research grants – can provide 
solutions. 
Second, further issues are raised by the increasing narrowness of expertise and the shift 
toward team production in science.  The issues are partly a matter of evaluating innovations.  
The evaluation of ideas is a central role of government that relies on the correct application of 
expertise within government institutions. Evaluation is necessary ex-post of innovations, 
particularly in securing intellectual property rights through the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  Evaluation is also necessary ex-ante of innovations, particularly in 
allocating limited research grant support through government agencies such as the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Science Foundation (NSF).  Traditionally, the USPTO 
has used a single examiner to evaluate and adjust the property rights claims in a patent.  The NIH 
has employed a panel evaluation model within particular study sections, which cover narrowly 
delimited areas of science. These evaluation models may be increasingly ineffective for 
assessing broader ideas. While researchers and innovators themselves increasingly use teams 
(and teams of growing size) that can span broad bodies of knowledge, their research ideas may 
be constrained by evaluation systems that bring limited breadth of expertise to bear.  In fact, the 
NIH is actively wrestling with a perceived failure to fund “multi-disciplinary” research, and the 
patent office has experimented with a “Peer-to-Patent” program to better aggregate expertise in 
evaluating patent applications. These efforts are reacting to consequences of narrowness without 
necessarily grounding policy initiatives in an underlying framework for how science itself is 
changing or understanding how general these challenges are. Moreover, as knowledge 
accumulates, the narrowness of individual expert evaluators will only increase.  The basic 
evaluation challenges, if unmet, suggest increasing difficulties in allocating intellectual property 
rights and limited public research funds.
3 
                                                            
3 Related challenges for journal article evaluation and tenure case evaluation are also relevant but will be left aside 
here for focus. 5 
 
Further issues surround the effort innovators apply as they respond to the incentives 
science policy imposes. Evaluation methods that privilege narrow ideas or poorly evaluate broad 
ideas will constrain ideas with broad impact and direct effort away from work that crosses 
evaluative boundaries.  Grant-giving agencies and tenure systems that privilege narrowness will 
produce narrowness.  Meanwhile, major research prizes, such as the Nobel Prize and the Fields 
Medal,,remain oriented toward individual accomplishments, which might have been consistent 
with early 20
th Century science but appear increasingly inconsistent with 21
st Century science.  
Individual-oriented rewards encourage individual work and can foment credit conflicts, acting to 
dissuade teamwork and disrupt team function, even as teamwork has come to dominate science 
and become the typical locus of high impact ideas. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews a range of empirical 
evidence, showing that the role of the individual in science has changed dramatically in line with 
the ‘burden of knowledge’ mechanism.  Section III considers core roles of science policy, laying 
the foundation for further analysis. Section IV considers the implications of declining innovative 
outputs by younger scholars for science policy.  Section V considers the implications of the shift 
to teamwork for science policy.  Section VI concludes. 
II.  The Evolution of Science 
This section documents two central dynamics in science.  First, innovators have become 
increasingly unlikely to produce key ideas at younger ages.  Second, innovators have become 
more specialized with time and increasingly work in teams. This section summarizes this 
evidence and shows that these dynamics follow naturally if knowledge accumulates as science 
advances.  
A.  Life-Cycle Productivity in Science 
As foundational knowledge expands, innovators may naturally extend their training 
phases, resulting in a delayed start to the active innovative career.  Such a delay may be 
particularly consequential if raw innovative potential is greatest when young.  This section 
summarizes evidence of this pattern over the 20
th century, demonstrating a major dynamic in 
science: a sharp decline in the innovative output in the early life-cycle.  6 
 
Table 1:  Age Trends 
  Trends in Raw Data  Trends with Controls (see notes) 
  Age at Great 
Achievement 
Age at First 
Patent 
Age at Great 
Achievement 
Age at First 
Patent 




































observations  544 286 6,541 544  248 6,541 
Time span  1873-
1998 
1900-
1991  1985-1999  1873-
1998 
1900-
1988  1985-1999 
Average age  38.6  39.0  31.0  38.6  38.9  31.0 
R
2  0.032 0.016  0.007  0.189  0.173  0.020 
Notes:  All columns present trends in age, measured in years per century.  Age at great 
achievement for Nobelists is the age at which the individual performed their prize-winning work, 
pooling prize-winners in physics, chemistry, medicine, and economics.  For great inventors, age at 
great achievement is drawn from technological almanacs and covers all major fields of science and 
engineering.  These data are described in detail in Jones (2010).  Age at first patent, a different 
construct, comes from patenting histories for individuals in the United States, observing data since 
1975.  These data are described in detail in Jones (2009).  Columns (1)-(3) present trends in the raw 
data, i.e. regressing age on time.  Columns (4)-(5) present age trends while simultaneously 
controlling for field fixed effects and country of birth fixed effects.  Column (6) presents age trends 
while controlling for field and patent assignee type fixed effects (e.g. corporation, government lab, 
et cetera). Robust standard errors for the age trends are given in parentheses.  
** Indicates 
significance at a 95% confidence level.  
*** Indicates significance at a 99% confidence level. 
 
 
Table 1 shows basic age trends for three groups.  The first group is Nobel Prize winners 
in physics, chemistry, medicine, and economics. Such individuals have produced their award-
winning achievements at increasingly older ages, with the mean age at great achievement 
increasing by 5.83 years over the 20
th century (column 1).   The second group is great 
technological innovators, as listed in technological almanacs documenting major technological 
breakthroughs through history.  The noted breakthroughs have also come at increasingly older 
ages, with the mean age at great achievement increasing by 4.86 years over the 20
th century 7 
 
(column 2).  The data and results are described in detail in Jones (2010).  The third group 
consists of more ‘ordinary’ inventors and considers the age at first patent, using U.S. patent data 
since 1975 across all technological fields.  These individuals show a substantial increase in mean 
age at first patent, at an equivalent rate of 6.57 years per century (column 3).  These data and 
methods are described in detail in Jones (2009). 
The similarity in these age trends, and the fact that they prevail both among great 
scientists, among great technological inventors, and among more ordinary inventors, point to a 
general aging phenomenon.  As shown in columns 4-6 of Table 1, these raw age trends also 
persist – and strengthen to 7 or 8 years per century – when controlling for field, country of birth, 
or the institutional environment of the research.  Age trends are also increasing quite generally 
when examine individual subfields separately,
4 either for great invention or patenting (see Jones 
2009 and Jones and Weinberg 2010). 
The rise in the mean age of great achievement over the 20
th century is dramatic and may 
represent shifts in research productivity at various phases in the life-cycle.  Jones (2010) 
therefore further analyzes the trends in age at great achievement, locating any shifts in life-cycle 
research productivity while also accounting for shifts in the underlying population age 
distribution.
5  As shown in Figure 2A, the analysis shows underlying shifts in life-cycle 
productivity, beyond any population aging effect.  In particular, there is a large decline in the 
propensity of Nobel Prize winners and great technological inventors to produce great 
achievements in their 20s and early 30s.  Peak productivity has increased by about 8 years, with 




4 Albeit with some interesting and informative dynamics, as will be discussed below. 
5 The aging trends among Nobel Prize winners and great technological inventors may follow in part from aging of 
the underlying population distribution.  In particular, if there are more scientists alive and active at older ages, then it 
is increasingly likely that great ideas will come from an older scholar.  Jones (2010) shows that about the half of the 
age trend in Table 1 columns 1 and 2 is driven by the aging population of scholars, while the remaining half is 
driven by declining research productivity early in the life-cycle.  See Jones (2010). 8 
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Notes: Fig. 2A presents an individual’s potential to produce great achievements as a function of age, comparing 
estimates for the year 1900 with the year 2000.  The estimates come from analyzing the full set of Nobel Prize 
winners and great technological inventors over the 20
th Century (source: Jones 2010).  Fig. 2B presents trends in the 
age at first patent, showing the advance in age at the start of the innovative career, using data on U.S. patent holders 
(source: Jones 2009).   See further discussion in text. 
These estimates, showing a substantial, increasing delay in great achievements, closely 
match the trend in age at first patent among more ordinary inventors.  Age at first patent is a 




Table 1, is further shown in Figure 2B.  Coupling Figures 2A and 2B, we see a remarkable 
consistency across these groups of innovators, suggesting a precise and general phenomenon: a 
sharp decline in early life-cycle innovative output. 
A natural mechanism for declining innovative output in the early life-cycle is a 
corresponding increase in training duration, which may follow naturally if the foundational 
knowledge in various fields expands as science advances.
6 This idea can be examined in several 
ways.  First, Table 2 shows that training duration for Nobel Prize winners, measured as mean age 
at Ph.D., increased by over 4 years over the 20
th Century.
7  The role of training duration can be 
established more causatively by considering exogenous interruptions to young careers. Jones 
(2010) employs World Wars I and II as such career interruptions and shows that these 
interruptions must be “made up” after the war, producing both (a) unusual delays in the 
completion of formal education and (b) unusual delays in the age of great achievement.  
Furthermore, Jones and Weinberg (2010) show that the age dynamics in great 
achievement within Nobel fields closely mirror field-specific dynamics in Ph.D. age.  Generally, 
for Nobel Prize winning work performed prior to 1900, 3 of 4 prize winners had received their 
Ph.D. by age 25.  For Nobel Prize winning work performed since 1980, only 1 of 5 prize winners 
had a Ph.D. by age 25. Jones and Weinberg (2010) further analyze the effect of an exogenous 
shock to the foundational knowledge in a field, studying the age and training patterns around the 
quantum mechanics revolution in physics. The quantum mechanics revolution is typically 
charted between 1900 and 1927 (e.g. Jammer 1966).  Remarkably, we find that (a) age at great 
achievement and (b) age at Ph.D. actually declined in physics during this period, reaching a 
minimum just as quantum mechanics becomes a rigorously established theory in the late 1920s 
and then rising thereafter.  Moreover, these patterns are unique to physics; the age of great 
achievements and Ph.D. age in other fields continued to rise during this period. Viewed as a 
                                                            
6 By contrast, a Kuhnian revolution in science may be associated with a contraction in the knowledge space, 
temporarily reducing training requirements.  See the discussion of the quantum mechanics revolution below.  
7 Age at Ph.D. is a noisy delimiter of the boundary between a focus on training and a focus on active innovation.  
That the Ph.D. age trend is somewhat smaller than the trend in age at first patent (an output-oriented delimiter) or 
age at great achievement suggests that other intermediate institutions, such as the rise of post-doctorates, as well as 
leaning-by-doing in the innovative process or other features, may involve further delays. 10 
 
natural experiment, the analysis of the quantum mechanics revolution further substantiates the 
link between the current depth of knowledge in a field, its training requirements, and the ensuing 
innovative output of young scholars. 
Table 2: Age at Ph.D. Trends 
  Dependent Variable:  Age at Highest Degree 
 (1)  (2) 
Year of Highest 







Data  Nobel Prize Winners  Nobel Prize Winners 
Field Fixed Effects  No  Yes 
Country of Degree 
Fixed Effects  No Yes 
Number of 
observations  505 505 
Time span  1858-1990  1858-1990 
Average age  26.5  26.5 
R
2  0.084 0.283 
Notes:  Both specifications consider trends in the age at highest degree among 
Nobel Prize winners. The coefficient gives the age trend in years per century.   
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  Field fixed effects for Nobel Prizes 
comprise four categories:  Physics, Chemistry, Medicine, and Economics.   Source: 
Jones (2010). 
 *** Indicates significance at a 99% confidence level. 
 
Collectively, we see a tendency toward broad and dramatic declines in early life-cycle 
productivity among great minds and ordinary inventors, and we see close relationships with 
increased training duration. Policymakers in some fields – especially in life sciences and at the 
NIH – have noticed related increases in training duration and a decline in grant awards to 
younger scholars, and are substantially concerned by these shifts within their field.  As has been 
summarized here, the aging patterns are a much more general phenomenon.  Policy implications 




B.  Teamwork in Science 
Knowledge accumulation further suggests a natural “death of the Renaissance man” 
effect, where the individual scholar is expert in a narrowing share of scientific and technical 
ideas as science advances.  Narrowing expertise will reduce the capacities of individual 
innovators to (i) draw on knowledge in other fields in their creative process and (ii) implement 
broad ideas by themselves. Narrowing expertise thus suggests fundamental changes in the 
organization of innovative activity, with innovators not only being more specialized but 
increasingly working in teams.  This section documents the second major dynamic in science: a 
general shift to team production and associated rise of teamwork as the locus of higher impact 
ideas. 
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Year  
Notes: For papers, the figure plots the mean number of authors per paper across 19 million journal articles indexed 
by the Institute of Scientific Information’s Web of Science database.  The Science and Engineering category pools 
articles from 171 different sub-fields while the Social Sciences category pools articles from 54 sub-fields, as indexed 
by the Web of Science.  For patents, the figure plots the mean number of inventors listed in each patent, using the 
NBER patent database.  For further details see Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi (2007) and Jones (2009). 12 
 
Figure 3 shows the trend toward teamwork in journal articles and patents.  The mean 
number of authors (papers) or inventors (patents) are plotted over time.  The journal article data 
incorporate 20 million publications since 1955 as indexed by the Web of Science.  The patent 
data consider 2.1 million patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from 1975-
1999. 
We see general increases in teamwork across Science and Engineering journal 
publications, Social Sciences journal publications, and patenting.  Mean team sizes have risen 
quickly, at rates of 15-20% per decade.  The shift toward teamwork also appears in virtually all 
subfields of research and invention, including 170 of 171 science and engineering subfields, 54 
of 54 social science subfields, and 36 of 36 patenting subfields (see Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi 
2007 and Jones 2009).  In percentage terms, over 80% of Science and Engineering publications, 
over 50% of Social Sciences publications and over 60% of patents had multiple authors or 
inventors by 2005, with the frequency of teamwork rising rapidly in all three areas. As with the 
life-cycle patterns, we see exceptionally general trends.   
Figure 4 presents additional analysis of individual specialization.  Figure 4A considers 
the probability that a solo inventor jumps to a new primary technological field across consecutive 
patents.  A declining tendency to switch fields suggests that individuals are more specialized.  
Figure 4A shows that solo inventors appear more specialized with time when considering all 
patenting fields; this tendency also appears in 34 of 36 technology subfields when analyzed 
separately (see Jones 2009). By contrast, Figure 4B shows that, when operating in teams, 
inventors move across technological fields with the same frequency over time – so that 
teamwork appears to overcome the increasing narrowness of individuals.  
The relationship between teamwork, specialization, and the depth of knowledge is further 
supported when comparing fields at a point in time.  Comparing across fields, Jones (2009) 
shows that deeper areas of knowledge are associated with more specialization and more 
teamwork.  Thus, the time trends and the cross-sectional field differences can be interpreted in a 
consistent and simple manner. 
 13 
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Notes: Fig. 4A presents the evolution of specialization for solo inventors, plotting the tendency for a solo inventor to 
switch technological areas across that inventor’s consecutive patents.  The probability of such field jump declines 
sharply with time, so that individual inventors appear more specialized, i.e. narrower in their technological span.   
Fig. 4B shows, by contrast, that when individuals work in teams, they jump between fields as regularly as before.  




Given that individual scholars and inventors choose whether to work alone or in teams, 
the increase in teamwork suggests that innovators find teamwork increasingly worthwhile.  That 
teams might have some advantage is further shown in Table 3.  First, we see that team-authored 
papers published between 1995 and 2005 have received more than twice as many citations on 
average than solo-authored papers. This large citation advantage appears in both Science and 
Engineering papers and Social Sciences papers.  Moreover, when looking at “home run” papers, 
defined here as those with at least 100 citations, team authored papers are 4.25-4.57 times as 
likely to produce such “home runs”.  In patenting, meanwhile, teams are associated with an 18% 
increase in mean citations received and a 65% increase in the probability of a “home run” patent. 
Table 3: Team versus Solo Impact 
  Mean Citations Received  Probability > 100 citations 
 Team  Solo  Team/Solo  Team Solo  Team/Solo 
Science and 
Engineering  11.95 4.55  2.63  1.21%  0.28%  4.25 
Social 
Sciences  8.74 3.31  2.64 0.59%  0.13%  4.57 
Patents 6.66  5.64 1.18  0.025%  0.015% 1.65 
Notes:  This table considers all papers published in the 1995-2005 period (as indexed by the ISI Web 
of Science and counting citations received through 2007), and all U.S. patents produced in the 1990-
1999 period (and counting citations received from other U.S. patents through 2007). 
   Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi (2007) further show that the team advantage in citations appears 
in nearly all sub-fields of Science and Engineering papers, Social Sciences papers, and patents.  
Moreover, the citation advantage of teams over solo work, and teams’ relative probability of 
home runs, are increasing with time, so that team production appears increasingly privileged in 
its citation impact.  In a number of fields, the team citation advantage reverses what had been a 
solo-inventor advantage in the 1950s, which emphasizes the changing nature of science and the 
decline of solo researchers as the locus of the most cited ideas. 
In sum, we see general shifts toward teamwork in the production of knowledge, and 
especially in the production of the most highly cited ideas.  
 15 
 
C.  Understanding the Evolution of Science 
If knowledge accumulation is an intrinsic feature of scientific advance, then the two 
dynamics in science, documented above, follow naturally.  As knowledge accumulates, 
innovators both extend their training phases and achieve narrower expertise, changing the life-
cycle of innovation and the value of teamwork.  The empirical value of the knowledge 
accumulation hypothesis is partly in its generality:  it can explain science-wide patterns, 
ubiquitous across fields and research institutions, both in time series and in cross-section, and 
aggregate a diverse range of underlying facts under a simple, unifying framework.  Knowledge 
accumulation can thus provide a foundational reason for shifting norms that have been perceived 
within individual fields, but typically without an appreciation for their generality or an 
underlying theory of change.
8 
III.   Core Roles of Science Policy 
Getting science policy right is a key role of government and, arguably, the preeminent 
role of government in terms of fostering increasing economic prosperity. This claim can be 
motivated by three mainstream observations in economics. First, a defining feature of the 
modern age is that certain economies grow and keep growing: the United States has repeatedly 
doubled its income per person since the Industrial Revolution, leading to unprecedented levels of 
income and associated increases in health and longevity.  Second, this growth comes largely 
through technological advance – the collective impact of an enormous array of novel ideas.  
Third, while markets are good at many things, markets face critical failures in the production of 
new ideas. 
The first two observations emphasize the importance of idea creation for economic 
prosperity.  The last observation suggests that government policy can play a critical and even 
necessary role in encouraging ideas.  Indeed, central features of ideas themselves may lead 
                                                            
8 Of course, when looking at any particular trend or pattern, other forces may play substantive roles.  For focus, this 
summary leaves aside alternative specific explanations for specific subsets of the facts.  Jones (2009), Jones (2010), 
Jones and Weinberg (2010), Wuchty et al. (2007), and Jones et al. (2008) discuss alternative explanations, and the 
reader is pointed there for further discussion. 16 
 
inexorably towards market failures – and particularly to idea underproduction in the absence of 
policy intervention.  To frame the analysis of science policy to follow, first consider two core 
features of ideas, the market failures they cause, and the particular government institutions that 
exist – and must be well designed - to combat them. 
First, ideas are typically harder to create than to copy.  More specifically, the production 
of new ideas involves fixed costs to conceive, develop, demonstrate, and market the idea.  If, 
once this hard work is done, entrants can freely adopt the creation, then the resulting competition 
will reduce profits from the new idea.  This ex-post competition can kill the incentive to produce 
the idea in the first place, especially to the extent that the innovator cannot recoup the fixed costs 
of their investment. Intellectual property law, especially patents, serves to limit this ex-post 
dissipation of profits, thus maintaining incentives for the technological advances that drive 
economic growth.  Patent-granting organizations, such as the USPTO, thus play essential roles in 
creating well constructed property rights for new ideas. 
Second, ideas are often cumulative, building one upon another.  To the extent that the 
creator of the initial idea cannot capture the returns to future creativity that the idea unleashes, 
the incentive to create an idea may again be insufficiently strong.  Patent law also plays a role 
here: by forcing disclosure of the idea, other innovators are more able to build upon it.  But this 
market failure may be particularly acute for basic research, where new ideas may have little 
commercial possibility directly but underpin hosts of downstream, commercial innovations.  
Here, direct government support for basic research (through the university system, government 
laboratories, and through institutions like the NIH and NSF) may thus also be critical to 
sustaining idea production and, ultimately, economic growth.  In effect, because basic research 
may provide little direct commercial payoff, the enterprise of basic research – including the 
researchers themselves - rely importantly on subsidies from public sources. 
Given this reasoning, we can consider three key aspects of science policy that the 
changing nature of science bears especially upon. 
1.  Entry. Scientific and technical progress ultimately relies on the entry of talented 
individuals into scientific careers.  To the extent that markets alone do not create 17 
 
sufficient incentives for entry, science policy is critical to support such career choices.  
On this dimension, lengthening training phases require special consideration. As 
research grants and patents come later in the life-cycle, compensation for the delayed 
start to the career appears needed.  
2.  Evaluation.  Effective science policy – both in granting patent rights and granting 
research support – necessarily relies on the effective evaluation of ideas.  The 
increasing challenge for an individual scientist to span broad research areas, as 
detailed in Section II, suggests the same increasing challenges for government 
agencies and the individual scientists within them who are tasked with evaluation.   
3.  Effort. Even conditional on choosing a scientific/technical career, the rate and 
direction of innovator effort responds to the incentives science policy imposes.  
Evaluation methods that privilege narrow ideas, whether in research grants, tenure 
systems, or elsewhere, will chill efforts to produce ideas with broad impact.  Incentive 
mechanisms that privilege individual researchers, including high-status individual 
prizes like the Nobel Prize, can undermine teamwork, even as teamwork is 
increasingly needed for broad impact. 
These challenges and possible responses are detailed below. 
IV.  Rethinking Science Policy: Life-Cycle Issues 
The extension of training and decline in early life-cycle innovative output, as detailed in 
Section II, raise the cost of becoming a scientist.  Labor economics provides a useful framework 
for understanding this cost.  In particular, let there be some value V to being a scientist once the 
necessary training is finished.  This value can incorporate the future wage stream, discounted to 
the moment one starts actively innovating.  More generally, the value V could include the 
expected value of research grants, status, or the simple joy of creativity, all viewed from the 
moment one begins the active innovative career. 
The problem with lengthening training is that it delays receipt of this expected value V.  
A standard economic model suggests that the cost of one year’s delay is about 10% of V.  That 18 
 
is, using a discount rate of 10%, it is generally true that a person will value one dollar next year 
at only 90 cents today.  By analogy, a wage stream must rise by 10% to compensate the 
individual for an extra year of schooling.  That this reasoning can apply usefully to labor markets 
is demonstrated by the fact that average wage returns to an extra year of schooling are about 
10%, a relationship that holds in a fairly stable fashion across time and across countries (Mincer 
1958, Psacharopoulos 2004).
9,10 
In science, this problem can lead to two straightforward selection effects.  First, there is 
selection across types of scientific careers.  While certain areas of science, such as 
biotechnology, have become increasingly deep, with lengthening Ph.D.’s and the development of 
post-doctoral phases, other areas of innovation have milder training commitments.  Perhaps the 
most spectacular example in recent years surrounds the “dot.com” boom.  In many instances, 
important innovative ideas, including retail concepts (e.g. book seller + internet), internet search, 
and HTML software applications required relatively little technical training at first.  The relative 
ease of entry into such innovative careers, other things equal, will tend to draw entrants away 
from sciences that feature long and extending training phases.  Note, however, that this form of 
selection is not necessarily a concern for scientific and economic progress.  Indeed, diverting 
talent and effort from a harder area of innovation to a less costly but possibly equally fruitful 
area of innovation may well be efficient.
11 
The second kind of selection effect occurs when talented individuals avoid science 
entirely.  For example, if careers in finance, management, or law require more static levels of 
training, then scientific careers will be increasingly costly by comparison.  The estimated 6-8 
                                                            
9 The 10% benchmark is true for richer countries.  Returns to education tend to be somewhat higher in poorer 
countries, which is consistent with higher discount rates in poorer countries, as reflected in higher interest rates in 
poor countries. 
10 The 10% discount rate may not apply perfectly to scientists, who may, for example, particularly enjoy learning or 
may be especially attracted to non-pecuniary benefits (see, e.g., Stern 2004).  Nevertheless, standard discounting 
likely applies to wage aspects of the scientist’s career decision and presumably the individual would, other things 
equal, rather not delay other benefits as well – whether social status or the joys of creativity and discovery. 
11 Some evidence for this selection effect appears in Table 1.  When adding field fixed effects, the age trends rise.  
This means that the increasing delay is actually higher within individual fields, but that scholars appear to be shifting 
over time to those fields where great achievements can be had at younger ages. 19 
 
year delay in becoming an active innovator over the 20
th century suggests, at a standard 10% 
discount rate, a compound 45-55% decline in the value to becoming a scientist.  This kind of 
selection effect may not only slow scientific progress but also slow economic growth, should the 
positive spillovers that follow from idea creation (see Section III) not feature in other white 
collar careers.  The recent finance boom, drawing talented undergraduates into quickly attained, 
high wage streams, may make this comparison particularly acute. 
A.  “Natural” Compensating Mechanisms 
Before considering policy mechanisms that can confront this selection issue and 
encourage entry into science, it is important to evaluate two possible compensating mechanisms 
that are naturally built into the economy’s growth path.  The first mechanism is increasing life 
expectancy.  As lifespan increases, the period over which a scientist can enjoy the fruits of their 
education may extend, raising the value V of being educated.  This effect might seem to 
encourage entry into high-training scientific careers.  However, discounting suggests such 
compensation may be small. In particular, when making career choices in the early life-cycle, an 
extra year of earnings, prizes, or status 50 years in the future may have little value in comparison 
to what is immediately foregone.  For example, at a discount rate of 10%, an additional year of 
schooling requires a 10% increase in V to compensate.  But an additional year of life 50 years in 
the future would increase V only incidentally from today’s perspective – in fact, by only one half 
of one percent.  Moreover, the increase in life-expectancy is presumably common across types of 
careers, so this “natural” life-expectancy mechanism has little if any inherent capacity to solve 
the selection issues above and especially the issue that talented individuals avoid science 
entirely. 
The second compensating mechanism follows naturally as markets expand in size.  The 
value of a patent will tend to increase linearly in the number of people around to use it, and 
increase similarly as per-capita income rises nationally and globally, raising consumers’ 
willingness to pay.  From this perspective, one can assume that, fixing the size of the 
technological jump embedded in ideas, the market value of a new idea is greater today than in 
the past.  This market size compensation can be substantial and may help explain why we 20 
 
continue to see growing patenting efforts and commercial innovation in equilibrium even as 
education duration rises and credit is diffused through teamwork.
12 
The “natural” compensation of market size is, however, much less clear for basic 
research. Unlike patents, the commercial value of a basic research idea (which may typically be 
zero) does not obviously scale with world GDP, even though the potential value from the idea’s 
downstream spillovers does scale with world GDP.  Hence, while the motive to encourage basic 
research remains extremely strong – and grows -- patent law does not easily transmit this 
commercial value into basic science.  It remains for other institutional forms of support, through 
agencies like the NIH, NSF, government labs and public universities, to confront the life-cycle 
challenges and encourage entry into basic science.  
B.  Policy Mechanisms 
To encourage entry into science, one may either (i) increase the value, V, of the scientific 
career, or (ii) speed up training, to bring V earlier in the life-cycle. This section will consider 
policy mechanisms that can influence both dimensions. 
The value V to being a scientist likely has several important components, including 
wages, status, and creative freedoms (see, e.g., Stern 2004).  To increase V, one could therefore 
consider several targets. Wages can be increased most obviously through public support of 
researchers, either in public universities, government labs, or the salary components of research 
                                                            
12 In practice, productivity growth, resulting in per-capita income growth, will enhance the market size for ideas but 
also increase wages in other careers, conveying no innate bias toward innovative careers.  However, population 
growth expands the market size for ideas without affecting wages in other careers directly (according to standard 
neoclassical growth theory where the aggregate production function is constant returns to scale). So population 
growth, unlike per-capita income growth, will tend to asymmetrically advantage commercial innovative careers over 
other careers.  We can therefore consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation.  World population growth 
has averaged approximately 1.5% per year since 1975.  Meanwhile, average team size in patenting has risen by 
1.1% per year since 1975, suggesting that the individual share of the patents’ commercial value falls by about 1.1% 
per year.  The rise in training, at about .08 years annually and with a 10% discount rate, reduces the relative value of 
an innovative career by 0.8% per year.  Thus, assuming that the rate and size of ideas is fixed once the individual is 
educated, the personal value of the innovative career would be increasing by 1.5% - 1.1% - 0.8% = -0.4% per year.  
Thus population growth may compensate substantially for the educational challenges in commercially-oriented 
innovative careers. If we consider a weighted population growth measure, which incorporates rapid increases in 
relevant technology buyers in China, India, etc, then the compensation will be higher. 21 
 
grants.  To maintain neutrality with other careers, a simple rule of thumb is as follows.  If 
training duration rises by Y years per decade, then with an R% discount rate, V would need to 
increase RY% per decade relative to the value of alternative careers that do not feature extending 
training phases.  For example, the evidence surveyed in Section II suggests that Y averages about 
0.8 years per decade.  With a 10% discount rate, V would need to increase by 8% per decade 
beyond the value increases of other careers.  A simple way to achieve this would be to increase 
salary support by 8% per decade or 0.8% annually above real wage growth in those careers with 
static training.  A closely related alternative would be to increase wage support during the 
training phase, through graduate student and post-doctoral stipends.
13 
One might also increase V through other dimensions.  For example, longer, larger, and/or 
less restrictive research grants at the height of the scientist’s career may be attractive in 
expectation and help offset the automatic disincentives that emerge as training duration 
increases.  At the same time, forcing grant dollars (not wage support) earlier in the life-cycle 
looks sub-optimal, in the sense that early-life cycle researchers are less likely to produce 
important ideas, as shown in Section II. 
An additional alternative is to accelerate training. This approach may be especially 
attractive and of increasing importance if an individual’s raw innovation potential is greatest 
when young.  Historically, Figure 2A suggests high innate innovation potential among young 
scholars (i.e. were training not occupying the individual’s time), which is consistent with the 
broader literature on life-cycle creativity.
14 This finding further amplifies the opportunity costs in 
the early life-cycle and especially the costs of “busy work” professional apprenticeships, where 
future innovators are saddled with rote, relatively low skill tasks that have little training value. 
As one response, science policy might increasingly emphasize a separate track of professionals 
who focus on rote analytical tasks, requiring less training and without anticipation of being 
                                                            
13 This discussion emphasizes keeping entry incentives “neutral” with respect to other careers.  Of course, one may 
imagine that research support levels are too low or high in general, and neutrality is meant only as one benchmark. 
14 The capacity for great ideas from young scholars is shown historically in Figure 2A when considering the 1900 
estimate. See also Stephan and Levin (1993), Simonton (1998), Weinberg and Galenson (2008), Jones (2010) and 
Jones and Weinberg (2010) for further discussion. 22 
 
research leaders. Such training and labor market segmentation could free graduate students and 
post-doctoral scholars who appear to have strong research potential to migrate more quickly 
through higher-value training tasks and into active innovation and creative leadership. 
More generally, increasing the quality, intensity, and/or focus of training throughout the 
early life cycle may all bring young scientists more quickly to the knowledge frontier, offsetting 
the expansion of foundational knowledge and allowing individuals to substitute toward active, 
high quality innovation at younger ages.  The training duration problem thus bears on education 
policy from childhood and suggests that a central goal of educational policy -- and one of 
increasing importance -- is to ensure that future innovators are being trained efficiently from very 
young ages. Achieving such acceleration is a complex matter that requires careful balancing and 
substantial additional study.
15  
C.  The National Institutes of Health Example 
  An instructive example is the current debates and policy actions at the NIH with regard to 
early life-cycle research.  It has been noticed for years that NIH grants are increasingly given to 
older researchers as opposed to younger scholars.  Between 1970 and 2007, the average age of 
new investigators (winning R01 equivalent awards) rose from 35 to 42, and the average age 
among all investigators rose from 41 to 50 (Moore et al., 2008).  Elias Zerhouni, the previous 
NIH director, described this aging trend as the single most important issue for U.S. science; a 
presumed cause is often claimed to be an increasing bias (for unclear reasons) by older 
evaluators against younger entrants (Kaiser 2008).
16  The primary response of the NIH has been 
                                                            
15 The policy issues bear on everything from “free play” formats in early schooling to the “liberal arts” emphasis on 
knowledge diversity in undergraduate education, both of which may delay the development of expertise.  However, 
because education systems are trying to achieve more than creating narrow expertise, education policy must be 
careful about what is given up in pursuit of acceleration.  For example, students may need time and experience to 
identify talents and passions, which can make early specialization risky. Educational systems are also trying to instill 
creativity itself, enhance socialization, build leadership skills, and develop other forms of human capital that may 
enhance innovative capacity in addition to other life and work skills.  At the same time, improving the quality of 
instruction (including math and science instruction from young ages) creates fewer tradeoffs if such improvements 
can be had with similar out-of-pocket costs and without taking time from other types of learning. 
16 Whether or not there is a bias of existing scholars against entrants, which is not clear, it is further unclear why 
such a bias would be increasing with time. 23 
 
to create quotas, forcing research grants to be given to younger scholars, even when their 
proposals receive lower evaluation scores. 
The smooth trends in NIH grantee age, however, can be understood through increased 
training duration and demographic shifts.  In fact, there is little that is unique about the recent 
NIH grant age patterns.  For example, Nobel Prize winning achievements in physics and 
chemistry show similarly sized, smooth age dynamics over the late 20th century (Jones and 
Weinberg 2010).  With regard to the biosciences, many observers have noted that doctoral and 
post-doctoral phases are extending.  For example, the duration of the Ph.D. in biosciences rose 
by 0.9 years per decade between 1970 and 1996.
17  This rate is very similar to the broader delay 
in innovative careers that was reviewed across many types of research in Section II. Thus part of 
the decline in early life-cycle innovation can be seen not as an NIH phenomenon or biosciences 
phenomenon, but as a much more general feature.  As shown in Figure 5A, the declining 
percentage of NIH grants given to scholars age 35 or below follows a broader decline in the 
share of young medical school faculty members, so that a large part of the trend appears not to be 
selection within academic scholars but rather the increasing absence of younger academic 
scholars.
18 
  These age shifts are also partly a function of demographics.  As Jones (2010) emphasizes, 
the 20
th century aging phenomenon in Table 1 is due partly to a decline in early life-cycle 
productivity (Figure 2) and partly to the increasing age of the background population.
19  This 
demographic effect is straightforward:  when there are more older scholars around, more ideas 
will tend to come from older scholars.  The baby-boom generation in particular has created a 
mass of aging scientists in recent decades. In fact, Figure 5B shows that while the percentage of 
NIH grant recipients age 50 or above has increased dramatically, this trend closely tracks the 
percentage of medical school faculty age 50 or above, so that we would expect the apparent 
                                                            
17 Author’s calculations, using data from Tilghman et al. (1998). 
18 Figure 5 presents the author’s calculations using the NIH dataset, “Age Distribution of NIH RPG Principal 
Investigators Compared to Medical School Faculty, 1980-2006”, which is available publicly from 
http://report.nih.gov/investigators_and_trainees/index.aspx (Access date: 16 March 2010). 
19 See also footnote 5. 24 
 
“bias” toward scholars over age 50 simply because of demographics.  A careful decomposition 
of these aging patterns requires further detailed analysis, but it should be clear that extending 
training phases and aging of the innovator population are important contributors, just as they are 
in understanding broader patterns in invention age over the last century. 
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  The NIH policy response to the aging pattern has been quotas for younger grantees.  
While the motive for this policy - encouraging entry into scientific entry careers - may be well 
founded, the quota response itself raises serious questions.  To the extent that it is increasingly 
difficult to produce key ideas in the early life-cycle (as suggested by expansions of foundational 
knowledge, increased training duration, and by observing Nobel Prize winners, great 
technological inventors, and ordinary patent holders through time), such quotas divert resources 
to projects with less innovative potential.  Increasing wage support for students, post-doctorates, 
or researchers, or accelerating training, as discussed above, may all act to attract talented 
individuals to basic research careers without redistributing scarce grant dollars away from top 
quality proposals. 
V.    Rethinking Science Policy: Collaboration 
Science is shifting universally from an individual to a team production model.  This shift, 
and the associated mechanism by which teamwork can aggregate expertise, raises challenges for 
how ideas are evaluated by government institutions and, more broadly, how scientists are 
rewarded for their work. 
A.  Individual Rewards 
There is a storied tradition in science of rewarding particular individuals for remarkable 
contributions.  This tendency is evident in the nomenclature of science, where celebrated 
achievements historically often carry the scientist’s name – Euclidean geometry, Newton’s laws 
of motion, Mendelian inheritance, and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, to name a few.  
Furthermore, there are numerous prizes, often with financial and status rewards, that typically if 
not exclusively tend to emphasize individual contributions, including Nobel Prizes, the Fields 
Medal, and the A.M. Turing Award, among many others. 
To the extent that individual scholars produce great ideas, incentive mechanisms that 
reward individuals appear to mirror the inventive process.  However, as documented in Section 
II, there has been a ubiquitous shift toward teamwork in science, both as the common format for 
research and as the organizational locus of the most highly cited work.  It does not appear that 
the reward system of science has caught up with this shift.  While individual contributions may 26 
 
still be noteworthy, and individual leadership can be critical to effective team function, 
rewarding individuals at the expense of teams appears increasingly in tension with the nature of 
science itself.  First, privileging individual rewards creates disincentives to engage in teamwork 
in the first place, giving individuals reason to horde ideas and avoid partnerships that would 
enhance the research but dilute credit.  Second, in choosing partners, individuals are encouraged 
to select partners partly based on ex-post credit considerations rather than effectiveness of the 
research team.
20  Third, researchers end up battling over credit ex-post if the project turns out 
well, as team members jockey for individual rewards. From this perspective, shifting toward high 
status and/or financial reward “team prizes” for particular innovations could help undo the 
incentive challenges that individual rewards impose. 
B.  Idea Evaluation 
The evaluation of ideas matters on two levels.  First, given some set of ideas, evaluation 
matters directly for creating well-defined intellectual property rights and for selecting research 
lines with high expected payoffs.  Second, evaluation expectations affect innovative effort itself.  
Innovators may choose and/or shape projects that appeal to biases in the evaluative mechanism 
(affecting the direction of creative activity) and may be dissuaded from innovative effort 
generally (affecting the rate of creative activity) if the evaluation mechanism is seen as especially 
noisy. 
Because expertise is necessarily limited, evaluation is necessarily challenging. Indeed, 
how can a single individual evaluate aspects of a patent application or research proposal that sit 
outside that individual’s own expertise?  Relying on guesswork will result in error-prone 
decisions.  Relying on a bias against the unknown will privilege narrow ideas.  An intuitive 
response to the increasing teamwork in idea production is to increase teamwork in idea 
evaluation, engaging multiple individuals that aggregate the necessary expertise.  Bringing the 
relevant evaluative team to bear can increase evaluative accuracy. 
                                                            
20 This point is an application of the Matthew Effect in science (Merton 1968), which becomes increasingly salient 
as teamwork becomes increasingly important. 27 
 
This ‘teamwork solution’ is not necessarily straightforward, however, and such team-
oriented strategies suggest particular features for effective evaluation. First, teams constructed 
within a narrow field will, by definition, be poorly suited to evaluate ideas that cross the field’s 
boundaries.  Thus team evaluation will be most relevant if team structures can be flexibly 
constituted to evaluate multi-disciplinary ideas. Second, locating appropriate experts is itself 
challenging, especially when the required expertise is not well understood by the initial 
evaluator(s).  This search problem may create demand for generalists, as opposed to specialists, 
with broader if shallower expertise and broader social networks.
21  This search problem can also 
create incentives for ‘open science’ style evaluation, where the public at large is given incentives 
to evaluate ideas.  However, public evaluation raises a third challenge around disclosure.  
Especially for early stage evaluation, disclosing a great research idea publicly, thereby allowing 
others to steal aspects of the idea, may dissuade innovative effort. 
C.  The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
The USPTO has long emphasized a single examiner model.  While there are explicit 
systems of mentoring between senior and junior patent examiners, and some informal teamwork 
in certain art units (Cockburn et al. 2003), a formal teamwork procedure to aggregate expertise in 
evaluating and shaping patent claims appears largely absent.  Meanwhile, there are ongoing 
concerns that the patent examiner system misses substantial prior art in its evaluations (see, e.g., 
Jaffe and Lerner 2004).  The recent “Peer-to-Patent” pilot program, which seeks to open prior art 
searches to the public, is an interesting open-science style approach to tapping aggregate public 
knowledge.  At the same time, it is not clear that the public at large has the incentives (or 
training) to help much in evaluating patent applications, and those parties who do have strong 
incentives, such as commercial competitors, may act strategically here.  The Peer-to-Patent 
program also requires earlier public disclosure of the technology, which can run against the 
patent applicant’s private interests and therefore incentives to invent. 
                                                            
21 The need for generalists, who can span areas of knowledge to improve team member selection and team function 
(including overcoming communication challenges between team members with distant areas of expertise), is likely 
growing as specialization narrows.  Educational institutions and training systems may need to further adjust to create 
such generalists. The role of generalists in teams, and its policy implications, awaits further empirical and theoretical 
study. 28 
 
An alternative mechanism would continue to rely on internal, professional patent 
examiners at the USPTO but flexibly form examiner teams for evaluation.  In such a model, 
narrow patent applications might still be assigned to single examiners, while broader patent 
applications receive scrutiny from examiners in multiple art units.  Such a system requires 
additional coordination, which may be costly.  At the same time, by deploying human capital 
resources so that examiners emphasize only those areas of an application that match their own 
expertise, this evaluation format may involve less an increase in total examiner time per patent 
and more a reallocation of time across examiners, leading to potentially mild cost effects but 
large gains in evaluative accuracy.  
D.  The National Institutes of Health 
The NIH is already team-oriented in evaluations.  The standard grant evaluation model 
employs panels of experts who meet to discuss promising applications collectively.  The panel 
evaluation is traditionally performed within narrowly defined study sections, which aggregate 
experts within particular knowledge boundaries.
22  This system is presumably effective at 
evaluating proposals that fall within the panel’s expertise. By contrast, it is inherently difficult 
for any standing panel to effectively evaluate cross-field work, an issue of increasing concern to 
the NIH.  The NIH is now actively working to promote cross-field research, seen as necessary to 
tackle certain major health challenges and to require a cultural shift within the institute.
 23 In 
addition, the NIH’s “Transformative R01 Program” is experimenting in part with a new panel 
review format that draws on experts in very different fields.  Such an evaluative mechanism may 
be increasingly important as knowledge continues to advance and field expertise narrows. This 
program is thus consistent with the evolution of science detailed in this paper, which provides a 
framework for understanding why narrowness has increased, why “multi” or “inter-disciplinary” 
research may be increasingly important, and how evaluative formats can change in pursuit of 
funding high impact science.   
                                                            
22 Currently, there are 178 distinct, regular standing study sections (see http://www.csr.nih.gov/Roster_proto/ 
sectionI.asp). 
23 See, especially, the “Research Teams of the Future” initiative within the NIH’s Roadmap for Medical Research 
(http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/researchteams/). 29 
 
VI.   Conclusions 
This paper shows that the role of the individual in science is rapidly evolving. Teamwork 
is increasingly dominant in science, while the contributions of young scholars are increasingly 
rare.  These patterns are remarkably general across fields and research institutions, and can be 
understood as intrinsic to scientific advance, where the accumulation of knowledge naturally 
results in increasing training duration and narrower expertise.   
By perceiving and understanding these patterns, isolated policy reactions to various 
symptoms can be more carefully founded in the evolution of science itself.  This paper has 
sought to clarify central policy issues, focusing on (a) maintaining incentives for entry into 
scientific careers as the training phase extends, (b) maintaining effective evaluation of both 
research proposals and commercial inventions as evaluator expertise narrows, and (c) re-tailoring 
the reward systems that direct scientific effort as individual accomplishments become rare and 
team production becomes dominant.  
More generally, the analysis suggests an inherent challenge to “status quo” science policy 
institutions.  Because science itself evolves, the appropriate form of science policy at one time 
will be less appropriate at another.  The inertial tendency of institutions makes the 
implementation of explicitly dynamic science policies challenging, but the stakes are high. This 
paper has sought to clarify the drag on scientific productivity that static policy institutions may 
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